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En este trabajo se analiza los procesos de ajuste en el uso de capital, obreros y empleados, usando un 
panel de empresas uruguayas. Nuestros resultados confirman la naturaleza discreta de los ajustes en el uso 
de los factores, la relevancia de los aspectos no lineales y la interdependencia entre los ajustes de los 
diferentes factores de producción. Se estima una brecha anual promedio en el producto debida a los costos 
de ajuste de 2% entre 1982 y 1995. Se encuentra que la apertura comercial afectó los procesos de ajuste 
de los tres factores. Sectores altamente protegidos ajustan menos cuando se trata de crear empleos que los 
sectores con protección baja, lo que puede reflejar desconfianza respecto a la reversión de las políticas en 
el caso de sectores con alta protección. Los sectores con alta protección ajustan más fácilmente 
comparados con los de baja protección al destruir empleos, especialmente en caso de puestos de trabajo 
de obreros. Ello sugiere que la protección puede contribuir a la destrucción de empleos dentro de las 
industrias, dado que las empresas en sectores más protegidos son más reacias a contratar y más dispuestas 
a despedir que aquellas en sectores con protección baja. Los resultados para el capital son 
cualitativamente similares aunque de magnitud inferior. En general, los impactos de la exposición 






Using a panel of Uruguayan manufacturing firms we analyze the adjustment process in capital, blue collar 
and white collar employment. Our results confirm the lumpy nature of factor adjustment, the relevance of 
nonlinearities and the interdependence between factor shortages. The average annual estimated output gap 
due to adjustment cost for1982-1995 was 2%. Trade openness affected the adjustment functions of all 
three factors. Highly protected sectors adjust less when creating jobs (reducing labor shortages) than 
sectors with low protection. This may be due to fears of policy reversal in highly protected sectors. Also, 
highly protected sectors adjust more easily (than low protection sectors) when destroying jobs (reducing 
labor surpluses), especially in the case of blue collar labor. This suggests that trade protection may in fact 
destroy rather than create jobs within industries, as firms in highly protected sectors are more reluctant to 
hire and more ready to fire than firms in sectors with low protection. The results for capital are 
qualitatively similar but quantitatively smaller. Overall the impact of higher international exposure is 
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1. Introduction 
 
The traditional microeconomic textbook model assumes that the level of employment and capital 
used by firms is optimal at any point in time. But since adjusting employment and capital is 
costly to firms, they often deviate from what would be optimal in the absence of frictions. In this 
paper we analyze such adjustment process and how it may be affected by changes in trade 
policy. 
 
There is a relatively large literature on adjustment costs in factor demand
1, however most of it 
focuses in only one factor of production. Those few studies that jointly consider the adjustment 
of capital and labor do not differentiate types of workers and in general assume convex 
adjustment technologies and do not use firm level data. Hall (2004) is a recent example of this 
trend in the literature. He analyzes a long panel 1948-2001 at the two-digit level of aggregation 
for the US. Our approach departs from this tradition at least in three aspects. First, it allows for 
non-convex adjustment, second each factor adjustment may depend on the shortage of the other 
factors of production and third it uses firm level data.  
 
The objective of this paper is to provide an assessment of the impact that trade liberalization as a 
source of competition for Uruguayan manufacturing firms had on the factor adjustment of blue 
and white collar workers, as well as capital. Are sectors exposed to more foreign competition 
subject to larger adjustment costs? Are adjustment costs more important in the presence of 
surpluses, when the firm needs to reduce its current level of employment, or in the presence of 
shortages, when the firms needs to increase its current level of employment? How does the 
impact of the higher international exposure differ for the adjustment of blue and white collar 
workers and capital? The answer to these questions will provide some light to whether more 
attention needs to be paid to facilitating factor adjustment as exposure to foreign competition 
increases, and whether the focus should be on hiring versus firing costs, capital versus labor, 
skilled versus unskilled workers, etc.  
 
The literature on trade and adjustment costs generally focuses on what are called social 
adjustment costs measured by the impact of trade reforms on factor unemployment. Magee 
(1972) and Baldwin et al. (1980) measure the number of workers falling in unemployment after a 
trade reform in the US, as well as the duration of their unemployment to provide estimates of the 
adjustments cost associated with the unemployment spell. Their estimates suggest that social 
adjustment costs represent only 4 to 12 percent of the welfare gains associated with the reforms. 
Matusz and Tarr (1999) in a review of the literature confirmed that the measured net labor 
employment effect of trade reforms is generally small.  
 
It is tempting to extrapolate these conclusions to the case of the Uruguayan manufacturing sector 
facing rising competition from higher international exposure. But there are two problems with 
this. First, most of the existing literature reviewed by Matusz and Tarr (1999) focuses on 
adjustment costs in the labor markets of developed countries. Regulation of factor markets in 
Uruguay can be significantly more stringent than in the average OECD country. According to 
World Bank (2006), Uruguay ranks 111
th out of 155 countries in terms of easiness for starting a 
                                                           
1 See Hammermesh and Pfann (1996) for a literature review. 
  3business, and 85
th in terms of overall business climate. Second, and more importantly, by 
focusing on the impact on unemployment (or employment levels) to capture factor adjustment 
costs, the literature assumes that firms are always at their desired levels of employment. If this is 
not the case, the small measured impact of trade opening on unemployment does not necessarily 
imply that adjustment costs are small, but rather that firms may be reluctant to fire or hire when 
subject to trade shocks, due precisely to the presence of very large factor adjustment costs faced 
by firms (hiring and firing costs, training, loss of firm specific human or physical capital, etc.). 
Putting it differently, one should expect trade reforms to have little impact on unemployment 
levels in the presence of large factor adjustment costs faced by firms (or private adjustment costs 
in Matusz and Tarr, 1999 terminology). In the extreme case where adjustment costs are infinite, 
there would be no impact of trade on employment, and the earlier literature would have 
concluded that there are no (social) adjustment costs. True, but there are very large opportunity 
costs in terms of production efficiency (and probably employment) due to the fact that firms face 
infinite factor adjustment costs.  
 
Although we do not specifically test the channel from trade to adjustment costs there is more 
than one way to think about them. Melitz (2003) presents a dynamic industry equilibrium model 
with heterogeneous firms. In this model, more productive firms become exporters and in order to 
profit from their higher productivity increase their labor demand. The increased demand in the 
labor market produces changes in factor prices that some firm can not afford at their current 
employment level and have therefore to downsize or exit. Thus, in a model with heterogeneous 
firms trade liberalization is likely to induce reallocation of factors of production that necessarily 
imply adjustment costs. Some of these adjustment costs have to do with changes in the usage of 
inputs of production and others have to do with changes in the identity of the particular employee 
or machine. As an example of the former we could think of disruptions to the production 
provoked by rearrangement of workers assignments due to changes in total labor or capital use. 
As examples of the latter there are search costs, training costs and severance payments.  
 
Another channel is related to the changes in relative prices between tradeables and nontradables. 
In general, trade liberalization process implies that capital goods become cheaper and more 
widely available (what Muendler 2002 calls the foreign input push). Even if the total level of 
employment is not altered, an increase in the level of capital comes in hand with reassignment 
and restructure of blue and white collar tasks. These adjustment costs are even higher when we 
consider the time necessary for the delivery, installation of the machinery and training of 
personnel. The irreversibility of investment stressed for instance in Bertola and Caballero (2004) 
makes firms reluctant to alter the capital level in the phase of uncertainty about future policies 
generating then adjustment costs that at least from this perspective may be higher for capital than 
employment.  
 
Either of the channels mentioned affects both capital and employment in a way that is likely to 
make the adjustment of one factor to be affected by the adjustment needed in the other. Also both 
channels suggest that the adjustment cost may vary with the task performed by workers. 
Moreover, in their literature review Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) mention that there is evidence 
that the average cost of adjustment is larger for skilled than unskilled workers. Therefore it is 
important to allow the adjustment process of each factor to be affected by shortages of the others 
and to differentiate between white and blue-collar workers. 
  4 
The closest reference to our paper is Eslava et al (2005) that provides a novel approach to 
estimating adjustment functions that overcomes many of the drawbacks of the previous 
literature.  Our work is clearly in the same research line but there are several dimensions in 
which our paper is different from theirs. First, we extend the analysis to three factors of 
production, allowing the separate study of blue-collar labor and white-collar labor, rather than 
simply employment. Second, we have a specific emphasis in trade policy shifts. Besides the 
interest on the effects of international exposure on adjustment costs per se, trade policy has 
variation in the time and firm (sector) dimension and is therefore better for identification of the 
effect that policy measures with variation only through time. Eslava et al (2005) look at the 
overall effect of policy reforms and therefore reflect aggregate policy changes with no industry 
variation. The lack of industry variation weakens their results that could be attributed to other 
contemporaneous changes. Third, as a broad measure of welfare costs we estimate the output gap 
produced by these adjustment costs.  
 
The next two differences relate to the techniques applied to estimate several parameters that are 
needed to apply this methodology. Forth our estimation of total factor of productivity is better 
shaped to take care of the simultaneity and selection bias problems common in this type of 
estimations. Fifth, for the demand shock instead of estimating the inverse demand function by 
two stage least squares we estimate a system of supply and demand using three stage least 
squares.  
 
Finally, instead of Colombian we use Uruguayan data. While in the 1990s in Colombia there 
were important reforms in factor markets, in Uruguay the most important policy and institutional 
changes relate to the country insertion into world trade. The Uruguayan economy evolved from 
inward looking, based on state interventionism and import substitution protectionist policies, 
towards an outward looking orientation, with more reliance on markets as resource allocation 
mechanisms and exports as the growth engine. A first phase of trade reform took place in the 
1970s, accompanied by a quick financial liberalization process. Later, in the 1990s there was a 
process of trade liberalization (with simultaneous real exchange rate appreciation), combining a 
gradual unilateral tariff reduction with the creation of Mercosur, an imperfect customs union 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. As a result, flows from and to these countries 
increased their share in Uruguay’s trade. Figure 1 shows the relative convergence to lower tariffs 
of most sectors of activity. A by-product of the trade liberalization process in Uruguay was that 
manufacturing firms switched to more capital intensive technologies as reported in Casacuberta, 
Fachola and Gandelman (2004, 2006). 
 
Our main results confirm the lumpy and asymmetric nature of firms’ adjustment process. Large 
shortages of one factor lead to less responsiveness in adjustment in the creation side of other 
factors but larger adjustment in the destruction side. Everything else equal it is easier to adjust in 
the presence of shortages (when the desired level is larger than the actual level): hiring 
adjustment costs are smaller than firing costs. Adjustment costs reduce the volatility of factor 
usage but on average they implied an annual gap between desired and observed output of 2%.  
 
Less protected sectors adjust a larger fraction of the gap in the creation side (reducing shortages, 
i.e. hiring employees or investing) but a lower fraction in the destruction side (reducing 
  5surpluses, i.e. firing employees, scrapping or letting capital depreciate). The reluctancy of more 
protected sectors to adjust in the creation side may be due to fears of policy reversal. The results 
on the adjustment on the creation and destruction side suggests that trade protection may in fact 
destroy rather than create jobs within industries, as firms in highly protected sectors are more 
reluctant to hire and more ready to fire than firms in sectors with low protection.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the policy experiments and the basic 
definitions of factor growth rates, factor shortages and adjustment functions. Shortages are 
defined with respect to some targeted desired levels. Section 3 details the methodology to obtain 
these desired levels. Readers not interested in the technicalities of this procedure may skip this 
section. Section 4 introduces the data and Section 5 presents the results and analyzes the effects 
of policy changes in the adjustment process of firms and finally section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2.  Estimating labor and capital adjustment functions 
 
In the traditional model without adjustment costs, the employment (capital) choice of the firms 
depends only on current shocks and future expectations. In the presence of adjustment costs, it 
also depends on past employment (capital) decisions and in the gap between the actual level of 
employment (capital) and the “desired” level. We will use the notation B*, W* and K* and B, W 
and  K for the desired and actual levels of blue collar labor, white collar labor and capital 
respectively. A key step in the present methodology is the construction of this “desired” level.  
 
The growth rates of labor and capital inputs are defined as the ratio between the input changes 
and the averages between its past and present values. These definitions follow Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992), and Davis et al (1996).












































       ( 1 )  
 
 
Before a firm adjusts its factors of production, the employment (capital) shortage at time t can be 
defined as the difference between the desired level of employment (capital) at time t and the 
actual level at time t-1. Paralleling the previously defined growth rates, the shortage rate is 
                                                           
2 A feature of these growth rates is that they are bound between –2 and 2. There is a monotonic relation between the 
rates of growth so defined and the usual ones.  
  6expressed as a fraction of the average between the present desired level and the past observed 
level. Therefore, employment (blue and white collar respectively) and capital shortages (ZBjt, 























































       ( 2 )  
 
 
Following Eslava et al (2005) adjustment functions (ABjt, AWjt, AKjt, for blue and white collar 
employment and capital, respectively) are defined as the fraction of each shortage that is actually 


























        ( 3 )  
 
The next step is to characterize such adjustment functions in terms of the shortages in all three 
factors. It is relevant to consider the case in which the adjustment function in each of them is not 
independent of the shortages observed in the other two. We follow a parametric strategy in which 
we allow capital and labor shortages to depend on their own shortage, on the other factors 
shortages and on interactive terms. In particular, the adjustment functions are not restricted to be 
linear and we allow for different intercept and slope for shortages and surpluses (or negative 
shortages). We do so because the sources of adjustment costs are different in the creation and 
destruction side. For instance, hiring new employees entails search, recruiting and training costs 
while firing current employees is associated with severance payments and eventual effects on the 
moral of the remaining employees. The basic specifications omitting the asymmetric interactions 




jt 6 jt jt 5
2
jt 4 jt jt 3 jt jt 2
2
jt 1 0 jt jt jt jt
2
jt 6 jt jt 5
2
jt 4 jt jt 3 jt jt 2
2
jt 1 0 jt jt jt jt
2
jt 6 jt jt 5
2
jt 4 jt jt 3 jt jt 2
2
jt 1 0 jt jt jt jt
ZK ZK ZB ZB ZB ZW ZK ZW ZW ) ZK , ZW , (ZB AK
ZK ZK ZB ZB ZB ZW ZK ZW v ZW ) ZK , ZW , (ZB AW
ZK λ ZK ZB λ ZB λ ZB ZW λ ZK ZW λ ZW λ λ ) ZK , ZW , (ZB AB
κ κ κ κ κ κ κ
ν ν ν ν ν ν
+ + + + + + =
+ + + + + + =
+ + + + + + =
 (4) 
 
























jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt
ZK κ ZK ZB κ ZB κ ZB ZW κ ZK ZW κ ZW κ κ ZK ∆K
ZK ν ZK ZB ν ZB ν ZB ZW ν ZK ZW v ZW ν ν ZW ∆W
ZK λ ZK ZB λ ZB λ ZB ZW λ ZK ZW λ ZW λ λ ZB ∆B
+ + + + + + =
+ + + + + + =
+ + + + + + =
   (5) 
 
 
The significance of the non linear terms would indicate that a firm with a larger gap between 
desired and actual factor levels adjusts more, hence this would be evidence of the presence of 
fixed costs associated with adjustment. These fixed costs cause the adjustment decisions to be 
lumpy. In other words if there is lumpiness in the adjustment process, then the percentage of 
adjustment towards the desired levels for each factor is expected to be increasing in the absolute 
value of the shortage of that factor. 
 
Our policy exercises will be framed in terms of an extended version of equation (5). We focus 
basically on tariff protection and trade reform. The first step would be then to estimate pre and 
post Mercosur adjustment functions as in Eslava et al (2005) detect shifts in the response of 
firms arising from changes in the environment. However, since this does not allow isolating the 
effect of individual policies from other factors also present in the period, we prefer to study the 
interactions of a set of policy variables (with variability at the time and firm level) with the 
adjustment functions. In our policy experiments we use the tariff level and the changes in tariffs 
to capture the effect of protection and trade liberalization. 
 
Finally, we find it useful to calculate the output gap attributable to adjustment costs. As argued in 
the absence of adjustment costs the desired use of inputs may be higher or lower than the actual 
levels. Adjustment costs are natural stabilizers of output. Suppose for instance there is a 
temporary positive shock to demand, firms wanting to profit from this positive shock are likely 
to increase their factor demand. Adjustment costs reduce the size of this increase. On the 
contrary, on a recession firms may want to reduce the input use. Due to irreversibility in capital 
investments this may translate even in larger labor demand reductions. Again, adjustment costs 
buffer such changes. Without denying the relation between economic performance and the 
  8ability of producers to adjust their input mix, it may be that at certain specific time period’s 
adjustment costs may not be welfare reducing. Once we have estimated the desired employment 
and capital it is straightforward to obtain the firm’s production at these factor usage levels and to 
calculate the output gap with respect to actual production levels.  
 
  
3.  Firm maximizing behavior 
 
A technical description of the methodology for the estimation of the desired input levels follows. 
We start by stating a general optimization framework and proceed to present the computation of 
the desired input levels and several necessary parameters. The reader interested mostly in the 
results of our exercises may skip this section and proceed directly to section 4. 
 
 
3.1. The general framework 
 
We assume a monopolistic competition framework in which firms have certain degree of market 
power. The inverse demand function for a firm is given by: 
 
jt jt jt D Y P η
1
   − =        ( 6 )  
 
whereη is the elasticity of demand and D is a time and firm specific demand shock capturing all 
factors other than firms’ own price affecting demand and Y is output demand.  
 
The firm’s production function is assumed to be: 
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φ γ µ β α =      (7) 
 
where K is capital, B is blue collar employment, H are blue collar hours, W is white collar 
employment, E is energy, M are materials and V is total factor productivity shock. 
 
Firms face competitive factor markets with the following total costs for blue collar labor, white 
collar labor, capital, energy and material: 
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  9where PW is the white collar wage, PK is the user cost of capital, PE is the per unit cost of energy 
and PM is the per unit cost of materials. In the case of blue collar employees, total compensation 
is the product of employment Bjt times a wage function that depends on total hours Hjt. This tries 
to capture the fact that the marginal wage is not constant. As the firm tries to increase hours per 
worker, it must resort to overtime hours and a premium must be paid at least for some workers. 
This function is indexed by parameters w0 (straight-time blue-collar wage), w1 (overtime 
premium) and δ (marginal wage elasticity). 
3
 
Eliminating the firm subscript, the maximization problem in the presence of adjustment costs for 
a typical firm is: 
{} ( ) [ ] ∑ − − − − − − − − −
t
t t t t t t t M t E t K t W t t B t t
t
M , E , W , H , B , K
W , W , B , B , K , K C ) (M ω ) (E ω ) (K ω ) (W ω ) ,H (L ω Y P E Max 1 1 1 β    (9) 
where   are the adjustment costs for blue collar, white collar and 
capital. Note that we specifically allow the adjustment cost not to depend only on the change of 
each factor, but also on the past levels of the others.




3.2. Frictionless factor levels  
 
To obtain the firm’s desired factor input levels, our procedure starts by estimating the firm’s 
frictionless factor demands. Frictionless levels correspond to those levels of inputs that the firm 
would choose in absence of adjustment costs, and are derived from the firm’s optimization 
problem. In the absence of adjustment costs, the dynamic problem of (9) can be rewritten as a 
static problem.  
 
) (M ω ) (E ω ) (K ω ) (W ω ) ,H (L ω Y P Max t M t E t K t W t t B t t
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− − − − −
, , , , ,
   (10) 
 
After taking logs, the first order conditions for both types of employment, hours, capital, energy 
and materials yield the following system of equations (where  X  denotes the frictionless levels, 
X ln X
~







                                                           
3 As in Caballero and Engel (1993), our functional form for the blue collar compensation implies that in the absence 
of employment adjustment costs, the firm would always choose the same number of hours per worker, and adjust to 
productivity and demand shocks only varying employment. Our data does not have information on white-collar 
hours, thus we have to assume a simpler compensation mechanism. In order to verify that our results are not 
produced by an asymmetric treatment of white and blue collars we experimented without considering blue-collar 
hours and effectively the main conclusions remained unaltered.  
4 We do not model explicitly the adjustment costs. The very interesting issue of which of the suggested (or other) 
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    (16) 
 
We assume that in absence of adjustment costs for hours, energy and materials, the frictionless 
levels of those inputs coincide with the observed levels. Therefore, the first order conditions can 
be reduced to a system of three equations and three unknowns. After solving it, we can write the 
log of the frictionless levels of capital, blue-collar employment and white collar employment as 
functions of the parameters of the model to be estimated and observed variables as follows: 
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3.3. Desired factor levels and output gap 
 
Frictionless levels are not the same as the desired ones. Both concepts differ in that the desired 
levels are the ones observed if adjustment costs are momentarily removed, while frictionless 
levels are the ones observed in absence of adjustment costs in all periods. Bertola and Caballero 
(1994) state reasonable conditions under which the desired levels can be approximated, up to a 
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where  ( ) ( ) ( ) jt jt jt jt jt jt W W B B K K   ,   and    ,   , ,
* * *  are respectively the desired and frictionless levels of 
capital, blue-collar and white collar employment. The firm specific constants to be estimated are 
Bj Kj θ θ   ,  and Wj θ . 
 
Following Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997)  Wj Bj Kj θ θ θ   and     , can be determined as 
the ratio between the actual and frictionless capital, blue collar and white collar employment, for 
the year where investment and employment growth for each type take their median values 
respectively. It is then implicitly assumed that, in the year of the median employment growth and 
median investment, the desired and the actual adjustment of employment and capital respectively 
coincide.  
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3.4. Output gap 
 
To define the output gap we make the extra assumption that total factor productivity is an 
exogenous shock whose stochastic process is not dependent on the levels of the inputs. Given the 
production function and the previous assumption that the desired and actual hours, materials and 
energy consumption coincide, the desired output is:  
 
() jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt V M E W H B K Y
φ γ µ β α * * * * =     (21) 
 
Adding firms’ output and desired output it is straightforward to estimate the output gap.  
 
 
3.5. Estimation of various variables and parameters  
 
 
3.5.1.  Productivity shock estimation 
 
We use Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) methodology to obtain a measure of total factor 
productivity by estimating a production function where an electricity consumption variable is 
used to control for unobservables. Such method specifically controls for two problems in this 
type of estimations: the selection problem (i.e. in a panel a researcher would only observe the 
surviving firms, hence those likely to be the most productive), and the simultaneity problem (the 
input choices of firms conditional on the fact that they continue to be in activity depend on their 
productivity). 
 
Given the production function specification in equation (6) we compute total factor productivity 
as:  
 








φ γ µ β α − − − + − − =    (20) 
 
where  and   are the estimated factor elasticities for capital, blue collar employment 
hours, white collar employment, electricity and materials respectively, and all variables are 
expressed in logs. The estimated coefficients of the production function are shown in Table 1. 
The null hypothesis of constant returns of scales is not rejected, though is not imposed. The 
standard errors are estimated across 100 bootstrapped samples.  
γ µ β α ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ φ ˆ
 
 
3.5.2.  Demand shock estimation 
 
We also estimate establishment level demand shocks based on the inverse demand equation (7). 
The inverse demand function is estimated in logs, and the demand shock recovered as the 
residual.  
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− = . In order to identify the elasticity of the demand equation we estimate a two 
equation system of demand and supply, using three stage least squares. Supply shifters include 
total factor productivity and a sector wage index, while time and industry effects are also 
included. Demand elasticity turn out to be -1.16 below Eslava et al (2005) (two stage least 
squares) estimate of -2.28 for Colombia. Given the smaller size of the Uruguayan market it is not 
surprising that firms face more inelastic demands and benefit for larger market power. Results 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
3.5.3.  Input prices and compensation function estimation 
 
Our database has input prices for goods, white collars, materials and energy. They all vary across 
years and four digit sectors. For the user cost of capital we use a constant value of 10%. The only 
parameters remaining to be estimated are those of the compensation function for blue collar 
workers.  
 
The postulated compensation function for blue collars is stated in (8). Bils (1987) and Cooper 
and Willis (2004) estimate for the U.S. the wage marginal elasticity δ to be 2. Eslava et al (2005) 
working with Colombian firms calibrate δ to 2 and w1 to the legally overtime premium and 
estimate from their data the straight-time wage w0. We also calibrate δ to 2 and perform a non 







In this paper we exploit Uruguayan establishment level data covering a considerably long period 
of time. We use annual establishment level observations from the Manufacturing Survey 
conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) for the period 1982-1995. The survey-
sampling frame encompasses all Uruguayan manufacturing establishments with five or more 
employees.  
 
The INE divided each four digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) sector in 
two groups. All establishments with more than 100 employees were included in the survey; the 
random sampling process of firms with less than 100 employees satisfies the criterion that the 
total employment of all the selected establishments must account at least for 60% of the total 
employment of the sector according to the economic Census (1978 or 1988). In total, we have 
627 different establishments present in at least one period.
5
 
                                                           
5 A more detailed analysis of the data is available in Casacuberta, Fachola and Gandelman (2006) 
  14In respect of employment categories The INE distinguish between obreros and empleados (in 
Spanish). This corresponds to our definitions of blue and white collar workers respectively. The 
first category includes personnel in operative activities involving mainly manual and physical 
tasks. The second includes workers performing mainly intellectual tasks, including 
administrative, clerical, sales-persons, managers, supervisors, directors, laboratory and research 
and development personnel.  
 
Starting from the 1988 capital stock data from the economic census,  the capital series is 
constructed using the perpetual inventory method back and forward (see the appendix for 
details). Finally, we use data on import tariffs for the period 1985-1995 from Casacuberta, 




5.  Adjustment functions and the effects of policy changes in the adjustment process  
 
 
5.1. General results 
 
In this section we present our baseline adjustment function estimations. In Figure 2 we display 
the histograms of the estimated shortages for blue and white collar workers and capital. Their 
distributions are roughly symmetric. Table 4 presents summary statistics on the desired, 
frictionless and actual input levels. All correlations are high suggesting the model predicts 
reasonably well. For the whole manufacturing sector the level of desired white collar jobs is 15% 
above the actual one and the desired blue collar jobs and capital are 10% above the actual ones.  
 
Figure 3 shows the mean and median output gap defined as the ratio between firm’s desired 
output and actual output. The mean output gap for the whole period is 2%.  The gap follows the 
Uruguayan business cycle in a procyclical manner. In 1982, Uruguay suffered a deep exchange 
rate and financial crisis that led to three years of recession. In such years the desired output was 
below the observed one. In 1985, the economy started to recover but the desired output was still 
lower than the actual one. The next five years are expansion years and firms tend to desire more 
employment and capital than what they actually were hiring implying positive output gaps. Due 
to inflationary problems the government in 1990 undertook contractionary fiscal policies that led 
to a halt in GDP growth that was resumed two years later. This implied the negative gaps in the 
early nineties and the positive ones of the last years of our sample.  
 
Turning now to the adjustment functions themselves, we estimate the parameters in equations (5) 
by panel fixed effects regressions. For each factor separately we generate a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 when the shortage is positive and 0 otherwise. Interacting this dummy with 
the factor shortage and with the cube of the shortage we allow for asymmetric effects of 
shortages and surpluses, i.e. we allow for different levels as well as slopes of the adjustment for 
shortages and surpluses. 
 
The adjustment functions for white and blue collar employment and capital are displayed in 
Figure 4. Since our specification implies that every shortage in every factor and the interactions 
between them can potentially have an effect on the adjustment of each factor, we present our 
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adjustment is plotted as a function of the shortage. Negative shortages would indicate that the 
past level of the input is above the desired one (factor surplus), hence to close this gap the firm 
needs to decrease this factor, and it finds itself in the job or capital destruction side. Conversely, 
positive shortages show a past level of the input below the desired one, hence if the firm wants to 
close the gap, it will be in the factor creation side, i.e. it will invest or hire. 
 
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients of the baseline adjustment functions. The significance 
of the Pos interactions variable shows that the adjustment function in all cases is asymmetric 
with respect to shortages and surpluses in the intercept and the slope, with the exception of 
capital, where the asymmetry is in the slope only.  
 
Figure 4 also shows that there is an asymmetric behavior in the adjustment process. First, for 
small values of the observed shortage, white and blue collar employment adjustment functions 
show an upward shift in the positive side. This means that firms tend to adjust a larger fraction of 
the gap between the desired and the actual employment when the observed levels are below the 
desired ones, i.e. firm finds it easier to create labor than to destroy it except when the destructive 
adjustment is large. Note that for shortages in absolute value below 1, firms close a larger 
fraction of the gap of blue collar workers than the gap in other factors. A shortage of 1 or -1 
corresponds to firms desiring to triplicate or reduce to one third the actual use of the input. 
Therefore, for most firms, blue collar adjustment costs are lower than adjustment in other factors.  
 
Since in most cases the cross product terms that include the adjusting factor are significant, we 
can infer that, as conjectured, shortages of other factors are relevant to understand the adjustment 
process. The negative sign of these cross shortages terms imply that large shortages of one factor 
lead to less responsiveness in adjustment in the creation side of other factors but larger 
adjustment in the destruction side. In simpler words suppose a firm whose desired level of two 
factors is above the current level, the larger the shortage in one factor the lower the adjustment in 
the other. Suppose now a firm desiring to have a lower level of two factors than their actual 
value, the larger the surplus in one factor the larger the adjustment in the other. This points 
against (in favor or) economies of scope in the adjustment cost function in the creation 
(destruction) direction. That is to say, when firms want to hire more it is cheaper to adjust one 
factor at a time but when a firms wants to reduce employment or scrap capital it is cheaper to 
reduce the use of both factors together. To observe the effect of the rest of the factors in each 
adjustment function, figure 5 shows separately the adjustment function of each factor, where the 
shortages in the other factors are set at their mean values, and their mean values plus and minus 
one standard deviation respectively.  
 
The lumpiness of the adjustment process is shown by the fact that the size of the adjustment is 
increasing in the absolute value of the shortage observed in almost all cases, both in the creation 
and the destruction side. Our results also confirm nonlinearity of the adjustment process; 
nonlinear terms are in all tables statistically significant.  
 
Another asymmetry is given by the fact that estimated adjustment functions display a smaller 
slope in the creation side than in the destruction side. The differences in the slopes can be 
understood together with the differences in the intercepts. The higher intercept in the creation 
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slope of the adjustment schedule shows that they are able only to undertake smaller adjustments 
when there is a high positive shortage. On the contrary, the lower adjustments for small surpluses 
are associated with firms closing higher percentages of the gaps when surpluses become large 
enough in absolute values. A natural interpretation of this result is that there are larger 
adjustment costs associated to factor destruction (severance payments, loss of specific human 
capital, etc.) than to factor creation  (search, training, etc.).  
 
Comparing the different factor adjustment functions, both in the creation and the destruction 
side, the slopes for white collar are larger than for blue collar labor. Such features can be seen as 
related to the differences in adjustment costs for each factor. Labor unions tend to be stronger in 
industries more intensive in blue collar labor inducing higher adjustment costs on the destruction 
side when employment surpluses are large; i.e. there will produce to lower adjustment when 
shortages are large in the destruction side. The white collar adjustment function has higher slope 
than blue collar adjustment on both sides. When the shortage is small in absolute value, 
adjustment is lower in white collar than in blue collar. Conversely, if the shortage is large in 
absolute value, a larger proportion of the gap is closed for white collars than for blue collars.  
 
Probably this relates to the fact that white collar labor includes workers with specific human 
capital, which is difficult to create. Therefore firms probably may be willing to accept small 
shortages without adjusting, but the adjustment will be fuller when the shortage becomes large in 
absolute value. For instance, consider a firm that has more clerks that needed, but these clerks 
are familiar with the workings of the firm: if this shortage is not too large, the firm may prefer to 
keep these extra workers. On the other hand, if blue collars have less specific training, they may 
be more easily disposed. On the creation side, hiring an extra clerk implies higher training costs; 
hence the firm may prefer to use the existent workers more intensively if the shortage is small. If 
the shortage becomes large enough, the cost of the extra hours will be higher than the training 
cost of the newly hired white collar workers. This search and training costs have a fixed cost that 
can be covered only when the percentage of the gap closed is large enough.  
 
Finally, the effects of the shortage of the other factors in the adjustment function are captured 
both by the direct effect and the cross product effects terms, but their impact comes mostly from 
the latter. A negative sign of the coefficients of the cross product of the shortages (see Table 5) 
causes that the higher the shortages of the other factors, the higher the adjustment in the 
destruction side, and the lower the adjustment in the creation side (see figure 5). Many firms 
downsized and even exited over the period of trade liberalization. This implied the simultaneous 
destruction of labor (both white and blue collar) and capital. This explains why higher shortages 
in absolute value for capital (white collar employment) provoke higher adjustment on white 
collar (capital). According to the evidence presented in Casacuberta, Fachola and Gandelman 
(2004), firms in order to remain competitive switched towards more capital intensive production 






  175.2. The impact of international exposure 
 
To study the impact of trade liberalization and international exposure on the adjustment process 
we estimate several adjustment functions. We are looking at the way sectoral shocks (protection 
level, trade liberalization) affect the way firms respond to idiosyncratic shortages. Industries that 
were more open from the beginning should experience lower shifts in their adjustment functions 
due to the generalized higher international exposure.  
 
A problem with using tariffs or change in tariffs in the right hand side of equations is that they 
may possibly be endogenous. In our case this problem is less severe due to the fact that Uruguay 
is a relatively minor player integrated with its larger neighbor economies in Mercosur. Hence the 
common external tariff and the changes in Uruguayan tariffs to converge to the trade block 
protection level are basically affected by Argentinean and Brazilian political players and beyond 
control for local firms.
6
 
Descriptive statistics of our policy and firm variables are presented in Table 6 and Figure 1. We 
find that the average tariff was reduced significantly from an average of 43% to 14% between 
1985 and 1995. On average, annual tariff changes accelerated from –2.1% before 1990 to –3.0% 
after 1990.  
 
 
5.2.1.  Changes in import taxes 
 
To analyze the effects of trade liberalization in the adjustment functions, we interact the intercept 
and each factor’s own shortage terms (allowing for asymmetric effects in the creation and 
destruction sides) in the adjustment equations with the industry level change in tariffs. Table 7 
displays the estimated coefficients. In all regressions at least one policy interaction is significant. 
In order to assess how important are the differences in adjustment with varying levels of trade 
liberalization we simulate the predicted adjustment using the coefficients reported in Table 7 for 
different levels of changes in tariffs (0, 2 and 4 percentage points reductions) in Figure 6. 
 
Looking at the plotted adjustment functions, while for capital the impact of tariff reductions is 
really minor, a pattern emerges for both types of labor, in which the fraction of the gap actually 
adjusted decreases in the creation side, while increases in the destruction side. For white collars 
this is produced by a statistically significant change in the intercept while for blue collars it is 
produced by a change on the slope, also statistically significant. Firms in sectors that experienced 
higher tariff reductions where able to adjust a larger proportion of their surpluses than those not 
so exposed. It is interesting that this result is produced mostly for low levels of shortages while 
for blue collar is for higher shortage levels. Although, there is a small change in the plotted slope 
for white collars, this change is not statistically significant, therefore the lumpiness of the 
adjustment is not affected and changes should be considered more as parallel shifts. On the 
creation side it was the opposite: firms with lower tariff reductions adjusted a larger proportion 
of their shortages. 
 
 
                                                           
6 This is discussed in more detail in Casacuberta, Fachola and Gandelman (2004) 
  185.2.2.  Tariff trade barrier levels 
 
This exercise is similar to the previous experiment, but instead of using the import tax change in 
the firm’s sector as a shifter of the adjustment functions, we use the import tax level. Table 8 
shows the regression coefficients. Most policy interaction terms are statistically significant for 
blue collar and capital. For white collar only the constant shifter for the creation side changes 
significantly. Figure 7 displays the estimated functions for tariff levels of 10, 20 and 30 percent 
points and confirms the impression that the effects of protection level is stronger for blue collar 
and capita than for white collar.  
 
Lower tariff levels are associated to higher adjustment on the creation side, especially for blue 
collar jobs but also for white collar jobs and capital. The destruction side seems not to change 
with tariff levels in the case of white collar adjustment functions. For capital and blue collar 
labor, higher tariff levels are associated with lower adjustments in the destruction side, the 
opposite than the creation side. Thus, higher protection seems associated with lower adjustment 
costs for firms wishing to fire blue collars.  
 
This is an indirect way of showing that protection may in fact destroy jobs, rather than create. If 
shocks to firm are iid, our result implies that protection will lead to lower levels of employment. 
The reason may have to do with firms’ expectations. For instance suppose there is a generalized 
positive demand shock. A firm in a highly protected sector will not adjust completely in the 
presence of adjustment costs (e.g., firing workers) unless the government has credibly committed 
to maintain protection. If there is any risk that the tariff will go down, then the firm may be more 
reluctant to hire many workers than a similar firm in other sector that is not exposed to the risk of 
the government reducing tariffs. The same applies on the job destruction side. A highly protected 
firm that suffers a negative shock will be more likely to fire workers if the government’s tariff is 
not a credible permanent policy.  
 
Finally, note the higher the protection level the more convex the adjustment functions look like. 
Then, it may be that convex adjustment costs are not as bad an approximation in more closed 






This paper intends to use micro data to improve our understanding of the effects of policy 
measures on the adjustment of factors of production. On the one hand, the paper finds evidence 
supporting a number of regularities that the previous literature on adjustment functions has 
highlighted. 
 
Our investigation confirms that aggregate investment and job creation might be seen as the result 
of lumpy and discontinuous microeconomic decisions. Individual adjustment constraints depart 
significantly from the constraints implicit in the quadratic adjustment cost model. There are 
several sources of irreversibilities (technological, market-induced, increasing returns in the 
adjustment technology). The evidence provided seems to confirm a pattern that has important 
  19nonlinear features, hence consistent with such constraints. This impacts the use of all factors of 
production, particularly employment.  
 
Adjustment costs faced by capital, skilled and unskilled labor are non trivial in the Uruguayan 
manufacturing sector, which has consequences in terms of factor unemployment and economic 
efficiency. For skilled an unskilled labor, they tend to be larger in the presence of small surpluses 
(when the firms need to fire workers) than in the presence of small shortages (when the firm 
needs to hire workers). However, for large surpluses and shortages (e.g., exit and entry of firms), 
adjustment costs are larger on the entry side. These results suggests that in order to introduce 
more efficiency and generate more employment in the Uruguayan manufacturing sector, policies 
should focus at reducing adjustment costs for those firms that would like to fire workers 
(severance payments, mobility of pension schemes, etc.) and those that would like to enter the 
market (reduction of the number of bureaucratic procedures required, the number of days it 
takes, and the cost of the business registration license). Overall, most firms find that the factor of 
production with the lowest adjustment costs is blue collar employment. 
 
The existence of adjustment costs implies that the desired levels of white and blue collar 
employment and capital often deviate from the observed ones. In our data these deviations imply 
that the yearly gaps might be above 10%. To have an idea of the welfare costs of the adjustment 
costs, it is useful to consider that for the fourteen years covered in this study the average output 
gap is 2%.  
 
On the other hand, the paper intended to assess the effects of protection and trade liberalization 
on firms’ adjustment process. The constraints arising from the adjustment cost functions may 
become an important part of the policy analysis. Our results point to a significant shift in the 
adjustment functions for all the production factors before and after the increased liberalization 
that followed the Mercosur treaty. Specifically, trade policy variables measured by tariffs levels 
and reductions in tariffs significantly shifted adjustment functions. Firms in less protected sectors 
have shown higher adjustment fractions in the creation side and lower in the destruction side, 
particularly for blue collar labor. Sectors facing larger tariff changes, adjust less in the creation 
side, particularly for blue collars, and more on the destruction side. In the context of tariff 
reductions of Mercosur, those sectors more highly protected were probably those that faced the 
largest tariff reductions. Overall the impact of higher international exposure on factors of 
production is stronger for blue collar workers than for white collar workers.  
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To construct the establishment capital stock series, we follow a methodology close to Black and 
Lynch (1997). The 1988 Census reports information on the capital stock. We use machinery 
capital. We avoid overestimation of the amount of depreciation by calculating an average 
depreciation rate by industrial sector and year. The resulting depreciation rate is then used for all 
firms within each sector yearly. We further exclude the value of assets sold in our measure of 
capital, assuming assets have been totally depreciated at that point. Thus, the equation for 
estimating the capital stock for years later than 1988 is: 
 













δ          ( 2 3 )  
 
where j indexes firms; i the industrial sector, t the year. K is the capital stock; I is amount 
invested; δ is the depreciation rate; and D is depreciation in pesos.  
 
For years before 1988, the equation is reversed and each year’s capital is obtained by subtracting 
each year’s investment and applying a depreciation factor. The depreciation rate before 1988 was 
  22not available and was estimated using 1988 data. We ran a simple OLS model for the log of total 
depreciation conditional on the log of gross output, capital stock, total hours and electricity 
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Table 1   
Levinsohn-Petrin productivity estimation 
   
  Coefficients   Std. Err. 
  
White collar  0,148***  0,026 
Blue collar hours  0,234***  0,036 
Materials 0,314***  0,053 
Machinery capital  0,120*  0,063 
Electricity   0,200***  0,088 
   
Number of observations  5903   
Number of establishments  685   
Wald test of constant returns to scale:  Chi2 =1,51 (p = 0,22) 
Note: Dependent variable is gross output. All variables are in logs 




Demand shock estimation 
Three-stage least squares regression 
 Obs  Parameters 
Demand equation  5903  9 
Supply equation  5903  16 
  
Coef, Std.  Err. 
Demand equation     
Price -1,156*  0,619 
  
Supply equation     
Price 0,863*  0,520 
Total factor productivity 0,006*  0,003 
Wage Index  -0,376**  0,166 
 
Note: Dependent variable is gross output.  
Endogenous variables: gross output and price. 
Exogenous variables not reported: year dummies (supply) and 3 
digit ISIC industry dummies (demand) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3 
Compensation function estimation 
Non linear least squares 
 Coefficient  Std.  Err. 
  
w0 0,816*** 0,016 
w1 1,24E-07*** 6,36E-09 
Delta 2 
 
Number of obs  6198 
R-squared 0.832   
Adj R-squared  0.844   
Note: * Parameter delta taken calibrated to 2. 




Summary statistics: actual, desired and frictionless factor levels 
      
Mean values     
Variable Observations Mean  Std.  Dev. 
DW 5512  37  75 
W 5512  32 63 
DB 5512  115  208 
B 5512  105  168 
DK 5512  275333  788947 
K 5512  249379  657317 
  
Pariwise Correlations:    
 FW  DW  W 
FW   1.00     
DW   0.75  1.00   
W   0.72  0.85  1.00 
      
 FB  DB  B 
FB   1.00     
DB   0.66  1.00   
B   0.65  0.88  1.00 
      
 FK  DK  K 
FK   1.00     
DK   0.66  1.00   
K   0.63  0.82  1.00 
Note: K = actual capital, FK = frictionless capital, DK= desired capital   
Idem with B, FB, DB and W,FW,DK for blue and white collar 
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Table 5 









Constant 0.074 0.166 0.060 
 [0.022]*** [0.023]*** [0.021]*** 
Constant*Pos 0.137 0.1406 0.026 
 [0.039]*** [0.037]*** [0.036] 
(ShortageW)^2 0.189 0.029 0.006 
 [0.011]*** [0.012]** [0.013] 
(ShortageW)^2*Pos -0.103  
 [0.017]***  
(ShortageB)^2 -0.009 0.099 -0.025 
 [0.015] [0.012]*** [0.013]* 
(ShortageB)^2*Pos -0.071  
 [0.019]***  
(ShortageK)^2 -0.012 0.021 0.179 
 [0.011] [0.010]** [0.007]*** 
(ShortageK)^2*Pos -0.137 
 [0.013]*** 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageB) -0.042 0.0011 0.011 
 [0.014]*** [0.013] [0.016] 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageK) -0.025 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.012]** [0.014] [0.012] 
(ShortageB)*(ShortageK) 0.026 -0.058 -0.059 
 [0.016] [0.0121]*** [0.011]*** 
Observations 4945 4945 4945 
Number of id  627 627 627 
R-squared 0.3 0.29 0.37 
Note: Constant*Pos: Dummy=1 if Shortage is positive 
ShortageW. ShortageB. ShortageK are the shortages for white collar. blue 
collar and capital.  Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 




  tariff (%)  Tariff 
change  
1982 .  . 
1983 .  . 
1984 .  . 
1985 42.53  . 
1986 38.96  -3.47 
1987 35.49  -3.46 
1988 32.64  -3.46 
1989 32.07  -0.57 
1990 31.50  -0.57 
1991 24.59  -6.97 
1992 20.68  -3.91 
1993 17.09  -3.54 
1994 17.11  0.02 
1995 14.01  -3.14 
    
All period    
Mean 26.3  -2.8 
standard dev  9.9  2.7 
Percentile 50  24.9  -2.9 
Percentile 90  40.0  0.1 
Before 1990    
Mean 34.7  -2.1 
standard dev  8.2  1.8 
Percentile 50  34.6  -2.2 
Percentile 90  44.5  0.3 
1990 and after    
Mean 21.3  -3.0 
standard dev  6.9  2.9 
Percentile 50  19.8  -3.1 
Percentile 90  31.4  0.0 
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Table 7 
Estimated parametric adjustment functions 
Tariff changes effect estimation 
 
White collar  
adjustment 




Constant 0.026 0.167 0.062
 [0.030] [0.030]*** [0.031]**
Constant*Pos 0.196 0.116 0.038
 [0.050]*** [0.047]** [0.048]
(ShortageW)^2 0.201 0.032 0.006
 [0.015]*** [0.013]** [0.014]
(ShortageW)^2*Pos -0.076
 [0.023]***
(ShortageB)^2 -0.006 0.044 -0.022
 [0.015] [0.018]** [0.016]
(ShortageB)^2*Pos 0.026
 [0.026]
(ShortageK)^2 -0.009 0.033 0.179
 [0.013] [0.012]*** [0.013]***
(ShortageK)^2*Pos -0.119
  [0.020]***
(ShortageW)*(ShortageB)  -0.047 -0.002 -0.013
 [0.015]*** [0.013] [0.018]
(ShortageW)*(ShortageK) -0.025 -0.013 0.016
 [0.014]* [0.015] [0.014]
(ShortageB)*(ShortageK) 0.036 -0.040 -0.063
 [0.018]** [0.014]*** [0.013]***
Constant*Open -0.019 -0.002 -0.017
 [0.007]*** [0.006] [0.007]**
Constant*Pos*Open 0.012 -0.007 0.020













Observations 4278 4278 4278
Number of id  627 627 627
R-squared 0.33 0.31 0.31
Note: Constant*Pos: Dummy=1 if Shortage is positive. ShortageW. ShortageB. 
ShortageK are the shortages for white collar. blue collar and capital.  Open is the 
annual change in tariff levels. Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8 
Estimated parametric adjustment functions 








Constant 0.052 -0.181 0.057 
 [0.051] [0.047]*** [0.051] 
Constant*Pos 0.289 0.778 0.192 
 [0.080]*** [0.071]*** [0.074]*** 
(ShortageW)^2 0.207 0.022 0.009 
 [0.028]*** [0.012]* [0.013] 
(ShortageW)^2*Pos -0.136  
 [0.044]***  
(ShortageB)^2 0.002 0.177 -0.022 
 [0.015] [0.031]*** [0.015] 
(ShortageB)^2*Pos -0.083  
 [0.047]*  
(ShortageK)^2 -0.008 0.026 0.119 
 [0.013] [0.011]** [0.024]*** 
(ShortageK)^2*Pos -0.102 
 [0.035]*** 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageB)  -0.047 -0.012 -0.007 
 [0.015]*** [0.013] [0.017] 
(ShortageW)*(ShortageK) -0.022 -0.010 0.001 
 [0.013] [0.015] [0.013] 
(ShortageB)*(ShortageK) 0.030 -0.056 -0.052 
 [0.017]* [0.013]*** [0.01193]*** 
Constant*Tariff 0.00074 0.01419 0.002 
 [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.002] 
Constant*Pos*Tariff -0.006 -0.026 -0.008 
 [0.003]** [0.002]*** [0.002]*** 
(ShortageW)^2*Tariff -0.001  
 [0.001]  
(ShortageW)^2*Pos*Tariff 0.002  
 [0.002]  
(ShortageB)^2*Tariff -0.003  
 [0.001]***  
(ShortageB)^2*Pos*Tariff 0.002  





Observations 4507 4507 4507 
Number of id  627 627 627 
R-squared 0.32 0.34 0.32 
Note: Constant*Pos: Dummy=1 if Shortage is positive. ShortageW. ShortageB. 
ShortageK are the shortages for white collar. blue collar and capital.  Tariff is 
the sector average import tariff. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 2. Shortages Histograms 
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Figure 4 - Adjustment functions












-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2
White Collar Blue Collar Capital



























































-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2













-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2













-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2
All other shortages = mean Other shortages = mean+sd Othre shortages= mean- sd

















-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2
No change in tariffs 2 percent tariff reduction













-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2
No change in tariff 2 percent tariff reduction













-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2
No change in tariffs 2 percent tariff reduction
4 percent tariff reduction

































-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2









-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2













-2 -1,6 -1,2 -0,8 -0,4 0 0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2
Tariff = 10% Tariff = 20% Tariff = 30%
 